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 The household registration system, also known as the Hukou system, is arguably 
one of the most significant policies instituted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
the late 1950’s. The Hukou, a family registration system, serves as an internal passport 
and personal identification throughout the country. It provides different personal 
information such as name, gender, age, familial information, and “danwei” or work unit. 
 A person is ascribed their Hukou status at birth, based on that of either or their 
parents. For decades, the desired Hukou status was that of an urban or “non-agricultural” 
person. An urban Hukou provided many more benefits for the population than that of a 
rural Hukou, and even served to “restrict population mobility and access to state-
sponsored benefits”.1 It was advantageous for a person to convert their Hukou status 
when possible if they originally had that of a rural or “agricultural” status to gain more 
support from the state. While the basis of the Hukou divides the population into two 
classes, the effects of the registration system create a third among migrant populations, 
which is perhaps the most important group when considering social effects of Hukou in 
modern China. 
 After recent reforms, the usefulness of the Hukou system has come into question. 
Some scholars believe, that in modern China the Hukou has little to no impact on social 
standing and upward mobility. C. Chen and Fan (2016) argue that the Hukou is 
insignificant in determining migrant’s life chances after recent reforms. If this is true, 
than the Hukou can be considered an antiquated system and there is no reason for China 
not to abolish it. However, there are scholars who support reform of the current system 
thus leaving the very important third function intact. Furthermore, Chinese political 																																																								
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officials argue that the Hukou “‘cannot be eliminated’ as it constitutes the ‘foundation . . . 
for managing social order’ and has ‘great effect on fighting crime’”.2 
  The primary concern of this article is the widespread effects Hukou has on China, 
and whether reform, reduction or removal of Hukou policy would be most beneficial to 
the general public, and the state structure. This distinction will reveal whether further 
reforms also have the potential to be successful, whether the Hukou is effective in its 
current state, or whether the state should move towards abolishing the policy altogether. 
As China is rapidly developing the quality of live for rural peasants and rural migrants is 
deteriorating, and the answer to this is proper and enforced Hukou reform. 
 To answer this question this article aims to address three points. The first points 
are ensuring the readers understand the origins of the current Hukou system, and past 
reforms it has gone through to be what it is today. In order to understand the Hukou’s 
origins and functions, it is first important to know how the People’s Republic of China 
came to be, and how the Chinese Communist Party gained control. This article will also 
address past changes to the Hukou system, and how these may have affected the 
citizenry. It is essential to know if past changes led to further hierarchal divides within 
society or whether they positively affected the public.  
 Secondly, it is essential to know how the current Hukou system affects the general 
public, as this determines what response to the Hukou would benefit the state the most. In 
this sense, benefit is defined as increasing social upward mobility, as well as encouraging 
economic growth, and political and social stability. If changes to the current system, 
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including removal of the Hukou, prove to have little to no change in two or more of these 
factors then change may not be necessary.  
 The Hukou system is perhaps one of the most socially significant policies from 
the early Mao era. At one point in time it was considered the defining cause of China’s 
social and economic stratification. However, in recent years the social emphasis of the 
Hukou appears to be declining. The restrictions the policy once held in place has gone 
through reforms, both official and unofficial. These reforms are thought by many scholars 
to have removed an important part of the widespread effect Hukou has on the people and 
made it a less important factor in the social mobility for rural Chinese. Much of this can 
be attributed to loosening on one of the focal policies of the communist economy and the 
transition towards a Free Market in the late 1970s. Along with the market transition, there 
has been a greater allowance of rural peasants migrating to urban centers to find and 
accumulate wealth. A need for labor in industrial cities, as well as the creation of 
industrial cities in the early 1990s has allowed China to dial back its once strict migration 
policies. In modern China, rural migrants make up almost half of the urban workforce 
and nearly one-third of the country’s total workers. 3  
 The apparent loosening of the nation’s Hukou policy leads the public to wonder 
what uses the antiquated system still has.  While resource allocations and migration 
restrictions have been directly affected by Hukou reform, it is important to realize that the 
Hukou system has a third, less visible use that is integral to the social and political 
stability of the state. This is the ability of the Chinese government to track certain 
targeted populations.  																																																								
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 The state of the Chinese Hukou system is of international importance. As the 
rising economic power, anything that affects Chinese industry is highly important, and 
certainly warrants international discussion. The Hukou system once had a large effect on 
migrant populations, especially those who travel to industrial cities to find work, and by 
extension the economy. There have been criticisms that the Hukou system contributes to 
not only limited social mobility, but to the stagnation of the Chinese economy. The state 
controls a majority of industry, so the Hukou benefits and even employment 
opportunities are greater for those that have a local, non-agricultural Hukou.  
 
Section 1: History of the Chinese Communist Party and the Hukou’s functions   
 The People’s Republic of China formally implemented the Hukou system in 
1958.4 Each family is registered under the same Hukou, originally that of the mother’s 
status. After registration,  a family is issued a residents booklet, 居民户口簿. This 
booklet is the source of many social benefits among Chinese citizens, as well as different 
identification information for the family and individuals. In order to comprehend the uses 
of the Hukou and how the system developed into such a polarizing policy, it is important 
to look into the rise of the Communist party and why the policy was developed and 
implemented.  
 With the change of power in 1949, China became a communist nation. 
Throughout the following years, the communist party implemented various policies that 
would strengthen the party and exert control over the populace. Perhaps the most 
successful and long lasting of these policies was the Hukou system.  																																																								
4 Chen, Chuanbo and C. Cindy Fan, “China’s Hukou Puzzle: why Don’t rural migrants 
want Urban Hukou?,”  
	 	
 In 1945, negotiations broke down between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and the Kuomintang (KMT), the nationalist party in control of the Republic of China 
(ROC) at the time. The struggle between the two parties dated back to as early as 1922 
when the KMT and CCP cooperated in an attempt to unite the nation and overthrow 
warlords, which were a result of the 1911 Chinese Revolution in China, only for the 
KMT to turn on the CCP in 1928 fearing a threat to their power.5 This resulted in a fight 
for control of the Republic of China’s government that would last for years filled with 
multiple failed cease fires, and international mediation efforts.  
 Chiang Kai-Sheik, the leader of the KMT, made the decision to turn on the CCP 
in 1928. He believed the communists were a threat to the Republic of China, and began a 
massacre of Communist supporters. In 1935, China was facing advancing aggression 
from Japan. Believing the Japanese “represented ‘disease of the skin’, whereas the 
‘communist bandits’ were ‘disease of the heart’”6 Kai- Sheik refused to work with the 
communists, even as the KMT was losing territory and power among the urban and rural 
populations. It was not until 1936 when Chang Hsüeh-liang, Manchuria’s former warlord, 
held Kai-Sheik captive rather than obeying orders to eliminate the communists 
negotiations were considered and the second United Front was formed. 7  
 In 1944 the leaders of the two parties, Chiang Kai-Sheik and Mao Zedong (CCP) 
were attempting to agree on a post-war government for the Republic of China. The two 
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Office of the Historian, accessed March 27, 2017, 
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parties were united in the effort to rid China of the Japanese and regain control of 
Manchuria after the end of the Sino-Japanese war, and as a united front were trying to 
establish a co-government between the communist and nationalist parties. When 
negotiations fell through, the country entered into a period of direct conflict and fighting 
over several provinces. In the following years, negotiations broke through multiple times 
and the international community became involved in the effort. In 1944, the Soviet Red 
Army helped the Chinese communists regain control over Manchuria, while holding the 
territory from the nationalist rule. The international community, specifically the United 
States, was involved as well. In a hope to end communism, the US sent mediators to 
China to negotiate peace talks and aid the KMT with the power struggle.  
 The peace talks were enough to prolong the struggle and weaken the KMT.  In 
September 1948, the CCP started an all-out offensive tactic in the civil war, eventually 
turning the conflict in their favor and allowing them to complete their takeover of the 
northwest provinces. Barely over a year later, Mao Zedong proclaimed the creation of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949.    
 Once the civil war was over, and the CCP gained control of the country, they 
turned their attention to the overpopulated urban areas. At the end of the civil war, urban 
centers were overwhelmed with migrant populations. The CCP set a goal of repatriating 
some of these migrants back to the countryside after they were “”deceived by the enemy” 
to migrate from the countryside during the civil war.8 
 The conditions of the civil war set the path for the years following and the 
communist policies put into effect to After the CCP gained control from the KMT, the 																																																								
8 Cheng, Tiejun and Mark Selden, “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s 
Hukou System.” 647 
	 	
new ruler Mao Zedong, began implementing various socialist policies to help alleviate 
the stress on the Nation’s economy and in an attempt to industrialize the nation, many of 
these had a causal relationship on the disparities the Hukou had on the Chinese people. 
One example of a failed policy of Mao’s was the Great Leap Forward, an attempt to 
rapidly industrialize in the late 1950s. The Leap forward was ultimately a failure that 
resulted in the death of over 20 million Chinese due to famine, and rural labor shortages.9 
During the Great Leap, the Hukou system was not strictly adhered to, and millions of 
rural migrants flooded the cities, one of the largest migrant populations the PRC had 
seen.  
 In the 1960s the CCP implemented reform of the Hukou system, and created a 
forced exile. This is where the migrants from the era of the Great Leap were laid off from 
their urban jobs and repatriated back to the countryside. An estimated 5 million people 
were laid off by 1959, with more to occur by 1962, and “the rural exile of 20 million 
workers”.10 The Great Leap Forward is just one example of policy that intensified the 
effects of the Hukou. The CCP’s desire to quickly develop the economy in many ways 
led to the different reforms the Hukou has undergone over the years, the original 
purposes of the Hukou system, as well as one of the major causes of the economic and 
socio-political disparities among status.   
 The development of the Hukou established a form of spatial hierarchy in the PRC, 
essentially creating a modern caste system. The population was divided into two statuses; 
Rural and Urban, or agriculture and non-agriculture. Originally, the status was assigned 
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based on that of a child’s mother, but this was later reformed to allow choice in which 
parent’s Hukou would be used.  
  The Hukou system was established as a type of population control, and way to 
track populations. This was especially apparent after the failure of the Great Leap 
forward as urban populations were growing at an impossible to support rate and grain 
rations were reaching a dangerous low. One of the main functions served by the Hukou 
is “resource allocation and subsidization for selected groups of the population”, this was 
typically the Urban populations.11 When the mass migration occurred during the great 
leap forward, a larger number of the populace was receiving urban resources and the 
supply was dwindling. In response, the CCP made the decision to reduce the number of 
urban residents and send migrant populations back to their villages. Despite small 
reforms over the year, resource allocation still acts as a major function of the Hukou 
distinctions. As China moves towards a market economy, this function of the Hukou 
system has been reduced in its traditional sense. However, there are still social and 
economic benefits associated to Hukou distinctions that are causing deep disparities 
between rural and urban populations.  
  During the rural migration, many returned to their villages voluntarily as they 
were unaware how difficult the Hukou system would make returning to an urban city. In 
the 1960’s when the Hukou system began being strictly enforced, the second function 
came to surface, this function being control over the flow of populations and internal 
migration. As a result of the strict control over migration, China urbanized at a much 
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slower rate than it industrialized.12 The Hukou system made migration from rural to 
urban areas very difficult, as there were legal steps to achieving permanent residence 
and transferring Hukou distinctions. While this aspect of the Hukou has been loosened, 
it is still a major source of inequality and corruption for rural-to-urban migrants in 
modern China.  
  The third and less recognized function of the Hukou is also perhaps the most 
important, it is the ability for the CCP to follow and manage “socially desirable 
people”13 [重点人口]. Every person is legally, and constantly, required to be registered 
with the Hukou police. The extent a person needs to be constantly registered includes 
when traveling with stays longer than three days. The presence of the Hukou system 
allows “each community to maintain a confidential list of targeted individuals to be 
monitored and controlled”.14 The constant monitoring allows the CCP to track people 
who could be deemed “threatening” to the regime.  
  The CCP’s ability to use the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and Hukou to 
track citizens and dissenters is a key factor in political stability, making this a crucial 
function. Potential reforms of the Hukou system would have to be developed with care 
and keep in mind this particular ability of the state and potential unintended effects it 
would have on political stability.  
 
Section 2: How does Hukou impact daily life?  
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 The Chinese people are divided on the basis of Hukou status, something that 
creates a major divide between the two populations and the differences in their care. 
Depending on where values are placed, it can be generally understood that a rural Hukou 
is inferior to that of an urban Hukou due to these differences.  One of the major 
differences between the two Hukou designations is the amount of state support, or 
resource allocation, given to the family. The Hukou system was effective in creating a 
hierarchy that resulted in the state “prioritizing the city over the countryside” and by 
carefully structuring the “differential opportunities afforded urban and rural people in 
general”. 15 This system served to institutionalize the rural-urban inequalities that China’s 
rural and migrant populations are still suffering from, and it is essential to understand 
these problems before looking into future reform possibilities.  
 A holder of an urban Hukou is given state support in the form of “state-subsidized 
food grain, education, employment, housing, health care, retirement, and other social 
benefits”.16 Many of these benefits were given with preference to the urban areas in 
hopes of supporting an industrializing nation. As a result of higher populations and a high 
desire to industrialize, the CCP began to favor the urban areas and leave rural China to 
their own devices.  The state includes many of these benefits into the budget and takes 
direct responsibility as the urban areas are viewed as “directly owned and administered 
by the state”.17 A family with an urban, or “non-agriculture”, Hukou is provided with 
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Hukou System,”  
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extra oversight and provisions from the state because of the involvement with China’s 
developing industry.   
 In contrast, a person with a rural Hukou is often self-sufficient. They are given 
“access to land resources, but are otherwise…[receive] very limited benefits from the 
state”.18 When the CCP first established the People’s Republic of China, the economy 
followed communist ideology, meaning there was no private ownership of resources. The 
communist economy is a large factor in why the rural Hukou does not come with some of 
the same resource allocation as that of the urban Hukou.       
 Those living in a rural area would be required to meet the government’s grain 
quota and be then allowed to keep the surplus for their own families. It was said that the 
rural Hukou holders had the resources that the urbanites did not. This was especially 
problematic during the Great Leap Forward and other times of economic hardship, which 
were common in the PRC’s early years due to inaccurate reporting and high quotas, 
which resulted in no surplus for the rural areas. In 1959, grain production was low and 
millions of rural Chinese were facing famine and death, and often torture when provincial 
governments wanted to get them to ‘work harder’.19 To escape famine in rural China, 
millions tried fleeing to urban centers. The early failures of the Mao era contributed 
greatly to the need for strict enforcement of Hukou policy.  
 With China moving towards a free market economy, the unequal resource 
allocation problem is less significant when discussing the consequences the distinctions 
have on social wellbeing. However, with the transition to the free market in 1991 brings 																																																								
18 Chuanbo Chen and C. Cindy Fan, “China’s Hukou Puzzle: Why don’t Rural Migrants 
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more areas for social stratification between the two Hukou distinctions. For the first time 
in years, it was possible for the Chinese people to publically accumulate personal wealth, 
making the urban regions of the country more appealing, as that is where industry is. 
  It was already common for villagers to supplement income by “going to the city 
in slack seasons or for longer periods” to find new opportunities, the Hukou system made 
that much more difficult.20 However, in more recent years the regulation on migration has 
been lessened as demand for labor increased, and millions of rural peasants have tried 
going to the cities to find work, for educational or training opportunities, and for upward 
mobility in social standing. As regulations on migration loosened, the dichotomous social 
hierarchy became more apparent. When studying the effects of Hukou on daily life, the 
population with non-local Hukou is very important. By measuring the hardships migrants 
have in urban cities and by comparing quality of services among rural and urban areas, 
researchers have been able to identify significant disadvantages associated with non-local 
Hukou in modern China. 
 Migrant groups account for a significant portion of the state’s population, and 
their experiences should be considered very important to society. For the purpose of this 
article, a migrant can be a rural-urban migrant or an urban-urban migrant, as long as the 
person has left their local hukou location. In China, a migrant can be in one of two 
categories, those that convert their Hukou status and those that do not.  A rural migrant 
who chooses not to convert their household registration status is known as a “floating 
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migrant”, and is part of the 79 million floating population in China in 2000.21 By 2010, 
the floating population rose to 221 million people, this is approximately seventeen 
percent of the total Chinese population.22  Urban areas like Shanghai, Beijing, and 
Guangdong have a large portion of the floating population burden. Areas like Guangdong 
and Shanghai have a large number of migrants, especially when comparing the percent to 
their local Hukou holders. Guangdong has long been the leading province for migrants 
with a population of 31 million in 2010, and Shanghai’s population is approximately 
made up of “42% of the population not residing in their places of Household Registration 
[Hukou]”.23  A large percent of rural migrants are young unmarried females. In a 
population study on Beijing female migrants Zhan (2011) indicated that 81% of the 
participants living in Beijing were unmarried, and had moved provinces when they 
migrated.24  
 The Floating Population is an integral part to Chinese industry, education, and 
social situations. Unfortunately, they are put at risk by societal factors and have 
significantly fewer opportunities and chances for upward mobility. The Hukou is a cause 
of this social and legal separation, as a migrant becomes an “outsider” in society, and 
reports discrimination by local urban residents, as well as exclusion and a disinclination 
to expand social groups. This mentality is furthered by the distinctions created by the 
Hukou system. Discrimination towards a migrant can be traced back to three different 
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levels within the state. The first is among the government, specifically among the local 
government officials. An official is more likely to aid a local resident before they would 
provide similar services to a migrant. This aid could come in the form of finding 
employment and affordable housing, which I will talk about below.  
 Another origin of discrimination and isolation come from the local residents. In 
terms of locals, migrant workers are often excluded based on their identity as both a non-
local resident and as a rural person.25 After working and living in cities for an extended 
period of time, it becomes easier for a migrant to disguise their rural/ peasant 
background. However, geographical differences contribute greatly to culture in China, 
such as dialect and customs, and it is substantially more difficult to disguise these 
differences. In Beijing, migrants have reported feeling isolated and opined that the 
natives were unfriendly and rude; some went as far as saying the Beijing natives were 
arrogant and distant.26  
 A potential source of this exclusion and attitude perception could be related to the 
residence location migrants live in. The Hukou system is closely related with housing 
provisions. The location a migrant settles down in is greatly affected by the Hukou 
system, as well as the family’s general socio-economic well being. In China living in an 
urban city, especially large ones such as Beijing or Shanghai, is very expensive. Many of 
these cities have outer suburbs that are much more affordable to live in, and have come to 
be referred to as ‘migrant enclaves’ as this is where migrants tend to settle. If a migrant 
converts their Hukou to a local Hukou, they have more opportunities for housing, but 
even then it is more limited. A floating migrant is severely limited in where they can find 																																																								
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affordable places to live. Without local Hukou, a migrant does not qualify for state-
subsidized housing nor can they qualify for a bank mortgage to buy a house in the private 
markets.27 The inability to find central and affordable housing pushes the non-local 
Hukou holders into the outside of cities. This increases cost of commutes for migrant 
workers as well as the time spent going to and from work, which can serve to ostracize 
migrants from urban society and further the notion that Hukou status serves as an indictor 
for a person’s worth to society.  
 In 2008 Beijing identified over 850 outer suburbs referred to as ‘villages in the 
city’.28 These ‘villages’ require dependence on transportation, public or private, to access 
anywhere else in the city. In 2015, I lived in Beijing for four months. While there I 
travelled around the large city using its bus system, the subway, and taxis. These different 
methods were crowded, required multiple transfers, or quickly became costly. Most 
importantly, Beijing is not a five-minute city, some trips required three transfers and an 
hour of the day, each way and I almost never traveled at rush hour. In a study on Beijing 
communities, Zhao and Howden-Chapman (2010) found that having a non-local Hukou 
was significant in time spent commuting. Not only did non-local Hukou holders (this 
includes those that have urban hukou from a different city) spend more time on average 
commuting, but they also had to rely on public transportation more, and were less able to 
walk to work or have their own car.   
 Geographic location and job type are significant influences in a migrant’s ability 
to achieve social integration. Some scholars believe the discrimination perpetrated by 																																																								
27 Zhao, Pengjun, and Philippa Howden-Chapman. “Social inequalities in mobility: the 
impact of the Hukou system on migrant’s job accessibility and commuting costs in 
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local citizens is not Hukou related, but solely social due to differences in perceived 
culture. However, the Hukou system’s distinctions create not only competition but 
provide different premises for “outsiders” within a community. The Hukou effects 
housing access, job access, and access to public education. Discrimination in these can 
occur despite state policy prohibiting them. The inability to get subsidized housing is 
creating a problem for the working population. Nearly one-third of the country’s 
workforce is rural migrants, and if they are not able to find adequate housing, then the 
country’s industrial development is put at risk. Implementing and enforcing policy 
associated with non-local hukou holders and assisted housing would benefit not only the 
lives of the struggling masses, but the longevity of the state.  
 The last level of discrimination comes from employers and social institutions. 
Despite recent policy changes, employers and other social institutions have the capability 
to discriminate against non-local Hukou holders. In the past, rural to urban migration 
went underreported, as migrants feared being removed from the province and returned to 
their villages. Unfortunately, this allowed a system within the community to take 
advantage of migrants and create widespread discrimination and social division. Access 
to education is one of these social institutions that are rooted in discriminatory and 
dichotomous rural-urban policies.  
 A major disadvantage for migrants is the lack of resources and hukou-subsidized 
benefits to improve their own standing and protect themselves against institutionalized 
discrimination. Education is one example of this institutionalized discrimination as 
children’s opportunities with public education have been directly tied to hukou status for 
decades. When the state turned its focus to industrialization and economic growth, it 
	 	
reformed the structure of education as well. The state set up multiple ‘key point’ schools 
that aimed to educate students to continue education, and though this term was removed 
in 2006 the effects are still present. Predictably, these schools were established in mainly 
pre-existing urban areas, and only accessible to those that had an urban Hukou.   
 These ‘key point’ schools can be attributed to some of the differences in 
education levels, as there was more support for urban students and the quality of 
education and resources was higher. The effects of the rural-urban divide on education 
can be measured by comparing the literacy rates. According to the 2000 census, the 
literacy rate of urban citizens over the age of 15 was over double that of the rural areas.29 
This can be attributed to the inadequate resource distribution and the hierarchal 
advantages given to the urban areas.  
 Educational resources are very biased in favor of urban schools. For starters, the 
state spending for the schools is drastically unbalanced. In 2007, the amount the state 
spent on rural schools was approximately “two-thirds of the total expenditure on urban 
secondary schools” when the population in rural areas was almost one and a half the size 
of urban areas. 30 This means that expenditures per students were much higher in urban 
areas, and these schools were better equipped to provide a higher quality education. On 
top of the larger state support, the average level of education for teachers in urban schools 
is higher than that of rural teachers with some rural schoolteachers not even meeting the 
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state mandated minimum schooling.31 On average rural schools have less full-time 
teachers as well. The shortage of qualified teachers in rural areas just widens the rural-
urban gap for education quality.  
 If a migrant is fortunate enough to relocate with any children, they still have 
significant barriers to education despite being in urban areas. The main obstacle is the 
difficult time getting children enrolled in schools. It wasn’t until 2003 that the state 
mandated that migrant worker’s children be allowed to enroll in public school without 
paying extra fees.32 Before then migrants would either have to pay fees for their children 
to go to public school, pay for private school, or not send their children at all. The lack of 
education is another example of the need for the CCP the actually enforce their own 
policy. China has a policy that requires nine years compulsory education for all citizens, 
but without Hukou this was not always possible.  
 Before some of the reforms on education, tuition could cost hundreds of dollars a 
year, with many migrants barely making enough for housing and food. The effects of 
high tuition can be observed through enrollment numbers. In 1995, nearly 100% of urban 
children were enrolled in school while “only 40% of migrant children were”.33 Despite 
the state trying to regulate access to public education, individual schools can take 
advantage of migrants and require additional fees, any by classifying these fees as 
‘charitable contributions’. By not enforcing their own laws, the central government is 
damning the migrant population to second class, but they are also making themselves 
appear weak. The CCP needs to 																																																								
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 China has a policy that states that all citizens must attend school for at least nine 
years. This compulsory school is three years of secondary school and six years of primary 
school, starting at the age of six or seven.  However, there is no policy about continuing 
education at university. In China, college entrance is determined solely on a student’s 
score on the college entrance exam, known colloquially as the ‘goakao’. The gaokao is 
taken in a persons registered province, and scored based on location as well. A student 
who has lived in Beijing all their lives but has a Hukou for a different province would 
have to return and take the test there where their score would be measured against that 
province’s students, which puts them at a disadvantage because the test’s materials and 
concepts vary between populated and rural provinces.34 Top tiered universities are 
located in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, and they will set aside spots for 
more students with Beijing hukou despite scores on the gaokao. This is resulting in less 
rural hukou holders being able to attend top universities such as Peking University (北大) 
and Tsinghua University, both of which are in central Beijing.  
 The disparity between educational opportunities among both urban and rural areas 
as well as local and non0local hukou holders is a significant form of institutional 
discrimination created by the Hukou system. There is a significant difference among 
level of state support for the schools, quality of teachers, and opportunity to attend 
school, as well as the segregation of the gaokao. Education is significant to social and 
economic mobility, and the hukou stands as an educational barrier for upward mobility. 
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Education is important for migrant children, but without employment a migrant would be 
unable to stay in the province.  
 Employers are able to take advantage of this need for employment and on average 
treat migrant workers drastically different from their urban employees. As of 2012, 
migrant workers were at major disadvantages when compared to their urban counterparts. 
The average wage was about 45% of urban worker’s hourly wage, only about 21% of 
migrant workers had unemployment insurance, those that had health plans were around 
27%, pension plans were at 31%, and work-injury insurances 23%. 35 These numbers 
have increased over the last ten years, but they are still significantly lower than those that 
are representative of the urban population.  
 The state has started to monitor employment benefits and attempted to introduce 
policy to protect workers and reduce inequality. Unfortunately, companies are finding 
ways to circumvent these policies, which is possible due to lack of direct government 
oversight.  One example of the policy to protect workers is the requirement of work-
injury insurance. In china, it is required for employers to purchase work-injury insurance 
for their migrant employees, but there are ways for companies to ignore this policy. A 
company can require their employees to waive their rights; this includes the work-injury 
insurance as well as others. In a study on Beijing’s female migrant population Zhan 
discovered that only 40% of the participants reported being covered by this injury 
insurance.36 The employers, who instead found ways around the policy, did not cover the 
other 60% leaving them vulnerable. The central government put this policy in place, but 
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doesn’t enforce it which allows the employers to take advantage of their employees. If 
the CCP reformed the Hukou and enforced the new policies, mistreatment such as this 
would be less likely.  
 Failing to provide equal benefits is not the only strategy employed by companies 
to control migrant populations. Migrant workers are faced with long hours, forced 
overtime, little social interaction, few breaks, and public humiliation, as well as isolation 
from their past communities and support systems. A series of incidences at Foxconn 
factories across China demonstrate the problems migrant workers are facing, and how 
management is not making appropriate changes.  Foxconn is an international company 
that focuses on electronics, has factories across the country, and is one of the world’s 
largest employers. One of their factories is based in Shenzhen, and employs more than 
430,000 workers in a province where there are 25 million migrant workers.37 This factory 
is where a many of Apple products, specifically iPods are produced. In 2010, this factory 
made the news for more than just their business. Over the course of four months in 2010, 
the factory experienced fourteen suicides among their employees and another three 
unsuccessful attempts.38 Of the suicides in 2010, the majority of them jumped from an 
upper floor of their dormitories. Non-local hukou holders are dependent on their jobs 
because they cannot stay in the cities without it, especially when some factories are the 
source of housing. Arguably, these deaths occurred because of the social stratification the 
Hukou   
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 The dependence on their job allows employers to mistreat their employees. 
Unfortunately this is not exclusive to only non-local hukou holders in China, but migrant 
workers are especially at risk. Workers report working well over the state mandated cap 
of 60 hours per week, and standing for such long periods of time that their legs swell and 
they have trouble walking.39 Undercover reports in these factories report forced overtime, 
shifts as long as sixteen hours, working eighteen days in a row, mandatory unpaid 
meetings, and crowded living conditions in the dormitories.40 Many of these jobs are also 
considered dangerous and tend to be unwanted by local-hukou holders. The situation is 
very similar to that of undocumented immigrants in America and the jobs they fill.  
 The majority of migrants report employment as their primary reason for moving. 
In these new areas, migrants are faced with the decision of whether or not to convert their 
Hukou status. If they chose not to convert their Hukou, they become part of the ‘floating’ 
population and are at risk as was discussed above. Many rural migrants stay in urban 
areas for a relatively short period due to the lack of access to social benefits and constant 
employment. A trend has developed in recent years where there has been a shift towards 
informal and temporary jobs. By 2008, “informal jobs made up 60% of the total” urban 
employment.41 An informal job is non-permanent and is regularly held by migrant 
workers rather than local Hukou residents, and the job market for these is very unstable. 
These jobs are often those that urban natives do not want themselves, as they are more 
dangerous or lower paying, and can frequently result in unemployment due to their 																																																								
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temporary nature. Very few migrants in contemporary China actually receive a work 
contract; they mainly work in the private sector that doesn’t provide job security.   
 It is possible that converting one’s Hukou status would decrease the overall 
negative effects for a migrant worker. There would be an increase in certain state-
subsidized benefits, while others would remain unequal. However, this will cause 
problems for those that were left at home. The effect of migration for work does not stop 
at those who left their homes for the new opportunities. If a migrant worker decides to 
convert their Hukou, they often lose the right to the land their families may have had for 
years.42 In the Mao era, land was distributed based on membership in the village. During 
this time, information from the Hukou system was used to determine location and size of 
land allotted to a family.  
 The new migrant population is primarily young people, who are working to be 
able to stay in the cities. Gone are the days where the majority of migrant’s had the goal 
to earn money for their families back home, where they would return after several years 
in the city. The new waves of migrants are facing many of the disadvantages as those in 
earlier years, including families to support. Due to China’s one child policy, there is a 
heavy burden on children to support their parents and grandparents. In rural areas, the 
policies on population control are not as strictly monitored as in the densely populated 
cities.  
 The Hukou system was not developed to intentionally create these drastic social 
hierarchies and problems. During the Mao era, the need to restrict population mobility 
was essential to state industry and economic development. For years, this function of the 
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Hukou served to benefit the state at the expense of the public. The balance of urban 
population and the state allocated resources served to limit urbanization while the state 
rapidly industrialized. By limiting who could travel to urban areas, the state also limited 
the rate of homelessness and urban decline, and the Chinese government was able to 
industrialize at a much faster rate than that of its urbanization. Now that China is focusing 
on export and industry, its need for unskilled and inexpensive labor is rising and the lack 
of policy is causing problems among the population.  
 By 2020 the migrant population is expected to double and urban cities will be 
unable to keep up with housing and social provisions. In modern China rural migrants are 
put at the bottom of urban social hierarchies and peasants are denied equal rights and 
have threats on their lands. At its current function, the Hukou status is a determining 
factor in these social problems. This is why looking at reforming or abolishing the Hukou 
system appears to have the potential to improve the lives of the disadvantaged. But 
without the Hukou, china is potentially losing an imperative ability to control their 
populations, and thus the social and political stability of China could be affected. 
 
Section 3: Hukou Reforms: Are they working? 
 The Chinese Communist Party has been making reforms to their policies for 
years. Since 1958, when the Hukou system was officially put in place, The CCP has 
made numerous changes to the policy and some of the institutions directly related to it, 
mainly within the scope of internal migration.43  This section of the article discusses these 
changes and how they impact the widespread affects and effectiveness of the Hukou 																																																								
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system for fulfilling its three main functions. For the purpose of this article, these 
functions are migration control, resource allocation, and social control of ‘targeted’ 
people.  
 One of the largest shifts in policy was the change towards a free market in the late 
1970s. This shift served to undermine some of the key differences created by the Hukou 
distinctions and greatly reduces one of the main functions, which the Hukou had served 
in the early years of the PRC. Due to the increasing shift towards free-market, the state’s 
need for resource allocation was significantly reduced.  
 The shift towards a more industrial free market economy led to a rise in need of 
unskilled labor, which led to many changes in China’s policy. China’s industry is 
primarily export driven, and to achieve the industrial goals cities needed more labor. 
Migrant workers were preferable, because companies could pay them less for unskilled 
labor. So after years of pushing migrants back into rural areas, the CCP reformed the 
once necessary restrictions on internal migration and allowed migrants to flood the 
cities.44 This is perhaps one of the most important reforms made to the Hukou system 
because by allowing an increased migrant population the CCP ultimately created the 
local- non-local social hierarchy.  
 In the 2000s, the government began to abolish the migration quota system. This 
reform allowed rural-urban migrants to obtain an urban Hukou in some small cities and 
towns. In theory, this would greatly help migrants who wanted to convert their Hukou 
and stay in the cities. However in order to obtain the converted Hukou, a migrant would 
be required to have non-agricultural employment and permanent housing for at least two 																																																								
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years.45 As discussed previously, this was not always obtainable for migrant workers, nor 
was the goal to convert Hukou and lose land entitlements in their villages.  
 On top of introducing a second-class urban population the loosening of migration 
policy had a great impact on the geographic development of Chin. The growing migrant 
population is a key factor to the development of industry, as well as the development of 
new industrial cities through urban sprawl. Due to this loosening of policy, China’s 
industry al cities have quickly become overcrowded. The populations of Beijing and 
Shanghai alone account for over three percent of the state’s total, with approximately 45 
million people living in the cities.  To accommodate the growing demand for industrial 
cities, China has made a practice of buying out agricultural villages to convert them into 
urban areas. State law requires that there be a “‘red line', declaring that the country must 
maintain a minimum of 120 million hectares of agricultural land” in order to protect food 
security.46 Despite this red line, the state has invested millions in creating more urban 
cities to boost industrial production.  
  One way they encourage this is by offering Hukou conversion, and other benefits 
to entice the villagers into selling their land. Due to declining urban provisions such as 
pensions and guaranteed job placement, the urban Hukou is significantly less appealing 
than the food security the village land provides, but migrants are still being coerced into 
selling. After loss of land, peasants are given an urban Hukou and sold housing in small 
crowded apartment housing that exist at the “bottom end of the urban market”.47 By time 
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the CCP began extending urban Hukou, the effects were not as significant. However, 
there was still the important distinction between local and non-local Hukou.  
 An important step in reform was localizing the power of the Hukou management, 
which occurred in the late 1990s. By taking the central government out of hukou 
management, provincial and township governments were able to change their area’s 
individual policies. From this came many changes on the Hukou system, but it also 
greatly reduced the uniformity of the state’s policy. An example of a local policy was the 
implementation of the ‘blue stamp’ hukou. This was permanent or semi-permanent local 
hukou granted in many cities.48 A requirement of this ‘blue stamp’ was often wealth, 
something average migrants did not have. Some cities such as Nanjing, are using the blue 
stamp Hukou to entice rich migrants to buy housing in the city, or to encourage 
intellectuals and skilled workers to migrate.49 This policy was extended to include 
spouses in 1999, and extended to more cities in 2011. These reforms allow more people 
to access the urban areas and their resources, but they are not overall successful. Reforms 
that allow only the wealthy to take advantage of their benefits do little to improve the 
overall social welfare of the population. 
 Since the beginning of the ‘deep reform’ period, critics have been questioning 
whether China was preparing to abolish the Hukou system altogether. Talk of getting rid 
of agricultural and non-agricultural distinctions has been around since as early as 1994.50 
Eliminating the Hukou system altogether would not automatically fix the social problems 
in China. Successful removal of the Hukou would first require a “fundamental shift in 																																																								
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China’s rural-urban relations”.51 It could be argued that such removal of Hukou would 
actually hinder the government from protecting and providing for the people. This 
concern is apparent through the reforms on Hukou registration and the Ministry of Public 
Security.  
 The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is responsible for monitoring the Hukou 
files in all of China. Over the years, the Hukou registration and tracking has evolved. Due 
to the importance of population tracking, the changes to MPS tracking warrant discussion 
with the reforms that occurred. In 1986, the MPS began to establish a Hukou database, 
which became computerized in 1992.52 Now, every Chinese citizen needs to be 
constantly and consistently registered with the MPS. Despite this policy, there are still 
migrants who move illegally and are not tracked. This puts the migrants in further danger, 
as there have been cases of police brutality occurring when arresting non-registered 
migrants. Also, a migrant who did not register their travel is even less likely to register 
complaints, get healthcare, and send their children to school.  
 
Conclusion: 
 While the Hukou system has gone through slight reform in the last twenty years, 
few of these changes have helped ease the suffering of rural peasants and rural migrants. 
The drastic socio-economic divide has been worsening since the Hukou’s implementation 
in 1958, and it will take years for some of the problems to improve. In it’s current state, 
the Hukou system is causing an urabn caste system, where rural peasants and migrants 
are not ensured many of the same rights as a local-hukou urbanite. This has the potential 																																																								
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to cause a developing country like China a lot of problems, not to mention the human 
rights violations it perpetuates. China should be taking steps to reform the Hukou and 
provide aid to their struggling members of society.  
 Migrant worker’s lives are slowly improving, and the central government has 
been creating policy that is supposed to eliminate the prejudice against those without 
local Hukou. Unfortunately, as discussed above these policies are not always enforced 
either due to indifference among the government or inability to do so. Due to the 
structure of the Chinese government and the vast size of the country, it is difficult for the 
central government to enforce every policy. Furthermore, with the emphasis on economic 
development and industrialization, the central government turns an eye to the injustices 
that without, the country would not develop at the pace the CCP desires.  
 If the government wants to further improve the lives of rural peasants and migrant 
workers, they should continue to reform the Hukou, but keep the overall system. There 
will potentially always be discrimination for outsiders based on culture, but with reform 
to the Hukou system it can decrease some of the problems with housing, employment, 
and education. With proper extended reform to the Hukou system, these social 
institutions will be held accountable and the lives of migrants and peasants will improve.  
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